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Jurisprudence "is a rational science,founded ipon universal principles of moral rectitude but modified by habit and authority. "---Lord Mansfield.
"Let us consider wherein the law consists and vwe shall find it to be,not in particular instances and precedent,but in the reason of the law."---Lord Holt.
Introduction.
Vaxims have always been considored a necessary part of the law. It has been said by r some writers that they are of the same force as acts of Parliamentwhen they have received judicial sanction. In order to receive this judicial sanction it would seem that the maxim should pass through a certain probationary stage of formation,as it were,and have proved its merit and value.
T'axims abounded in the cor.ron law,but on account of statutory modifications,changes in the mode of procedure and a multiplication of the reported decisions,many of the maxims have passed into disuse. Among those that are still intact is this one under discussion: In jure non remota causa,sed proxima,spectatur. It is the first of Lord Bacon's "IMaxims of
Law"
The origin of the maxim is uncertain. No trace of it can be found in the ca. K ivil law. Bacon intimates that some of the maxims in his work are orig-inal with him,and very probably this is one of them. It has been suggested by some authorities that Bacon drew the text of it from certain philosophical discussions which v re in the hands of nearly all thinking people at that time. This is doubtless the true source from which the maxim was drawn.
When Bacon wrote the maxim several methods of investigating truth were used by philyosophers,and it was Bacons purpose to prove that these methods were erroneous. He declared that the true method was by a search for causes;that no one questioned. He went still further and taught that the proximate cause was to be searched out,and the remote causes to be neglected. This mode of searching for truth has become firmly established in legal jurisprudence.
The meaning of the maxim is explained by Bacon in the following manner,he said "It were infinite for the law to consider the cause of causes,and the impulse one from another, therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause;and judgeth of acts by that without looking to any other decree."
The maxim was first employed by the courts as an autho--, tive rule in cases of insurance. Gradually its use has increased, a: d now it is used in certain cases where common carriers are parties,and in actions for negligence and :-reach of contract,when it is sought to determine the defendants liability for damages. On account of the different business and social relations which exist between the plaintiff and defendant in these different classes of cases,the line of reasoning which
3.
should be persued in attempting to determine the proximate cause in a case which falls in any one of these divisions, should be different than that used in either of the other two.
It is the purpose of this discussion to illustrate and set forth as clearly as possible the meaning and application of the maxim in these various branches of the law.
Application of the maxim.
A. In the law of Insurance.
Insurance is "a contract whereby for a stipulated consideration,one party undertahes to indemnify the other against certain risks." Philips on Ins. § 1.
When the contract is made the basis of a s'-)it to recover for loss sustainedit must be shown that the loss is not without limitation,and has never been applied in the matter of insurance to the extent contended for,but that it has been constantly qualified and constantly applied in modified practical sense,to the peril insured against."
8.
In Potter v.Ins.Co.3 Sumner,27. Story J. remarked that "In cases of this sort it will not do to refine 'o much upon metphysical sublities. If a vessel is insured against peril only,and is burned to the waters edge and fills writh water and sinksit would be difficult in common sense to attribute the loss to any other proximate cause than the fire, and yet the water was the proximate cause of the submersion.
If a vessel is insured against barratry of the master and crew and they fraudulently bore holes in the bottom and thereb: she sinks,in one sense she sinks from filling in of water, but in a just sense the proximate cause is the barratorious boring of holes in the bottom."
In the case of the Ins. Co.v.Transp. Co.12 Wall.
194,it appeared that the plaintiffs had insured their vessel against loss by fire. On her voyage a collision occurred,and as a consequence a fire :ias started :thich caused the vessel to sink. The court held that the fire was the proximate cause of the loss. It was remarked by the judge writing the opinion, that "Before any policy was issued,the transporters were the insurers against collision and 1"ire,no matter how caused.
They sought protection against some of the probable consequences of those risks,anu they obtained a policy insuring them against all losses by fire,except fire cause. by certain
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things of which fire by collision was not one. Against every other consequence of a collision than fire,they remained their own insurers,but the ris" by fire was no longer theirs."
In Butler v.Wildman,3 B.& A.3YD.
The facts
were substantially these; the owner of a vessel insured her against loss by the enemy. On being attacked by the enemy, the captain threw overboard a large iiuanity of Spanish dollars to prevent their falling into the h-ands of the enemy.
Bailey J. said, "It was the duty of the master to prevent anything which could strengthen the hands of the enemy from falling into their possession. Now as the money wo.Lld strengthen the enemy,it was the duty of the master to throw it overboard.
.... I think the enemy was the proximate cause of the loss."
In P agoun v. Ins. Co.l Story,157,the court said, "All the consequences naturally flowing from the peril insured against,or incident thereto,are properly attributable to the peril itself. If there is a capture,and before the vessel is delivered from that peril,she is afterw.vards lost by fire,or accident or negligence of the captors, I think it is clear that the whole loss is properly attributable to the capture. a It would be an over refinement and metphysical sublity to holL otherwise,and would shake the confidence of thn commercial world in the supposed indemnity held out by policies
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against the common perils."
See Levie v.Janson 14 East 648.
The correct line of reasoning and in applying the maxim is illustrated by cases where the property insured is placed in such a position by negligence or barratry of the master or crew,that it is acted upon by the peril insured against. In those cases the peril insurecd against is the proximate cause of the loss, unless injury caused by negligence or oarratry of the master or crew is expressly excluLed by the terms of the policy. In the latter case,the negligence or barrat-y of the master or crew is the proximate cause of the entire loss;otherwise no force would be given to the exception.
Ins.Co.v.Laurence 10 Peters 507.
Waters v.Ins.Co. 11 Peters 213.
In the opinion of the last case cited Story J.
remarked, "If we look at the question upon mere principle without reference to any authority,it is difficalt to escape from the conclusion,that a loss by a peril insurea against, and occasioned by negligence is a loss within a marine policy unless there be some other language in it ,hich repels that conclusion. "
II.
The same genc-i principles which should govern the application of the maxim in marine insurance,should be observed in fi-e insurance. A few illustrative cases will be sufficient to show the use of the maxim in that branch.
When a fire occurs it is usually surrouided by various elements,such as thievsbreakage in removin, gooc~s to places of safety,exrlosionetc. Which aid in causing loss.
Whether or not a claim for loss occasioned by any of these can be sustained against the insurance company,depenus upon construction the courts put upon the policy. If it should appear that the parties intended the policy to cover all such losses, the fire is considered the proximate cause,and these elements as simply incidents. But if,on the other hand,the courts find that it was the intention of the parties to exclude damages by these intervening causes,then the fire is the remote cause of any damage that the excepted causes may have occasioned.
In . his policy wias that the insurer "would only make good such loss as was occasioned by fire." Earl C.J. said, "What was the meaning of the parties under the contract?" He came to the conclusion that the loss was not within the meaning of the policy. In substance he stated that to hold otherwise,injury occasioned to a building by an earthquake,which was usually attributed to a subterranean fireor the shattering of windowglass by the firing of artillery at a review,vwould be damage by fire. Miller J. remarked, "In these insurance c,ses we are bound to look to the immediate cause. In this instance it cannot be siad that the loss was occasioned by fire,it was occasioned by a concussion caused by fire,and we must therefore go to the cause of causes before we arrive at the origin of the loss,but this was not was intended by the parties."
The danger of arriving at a conclusion by philosophical reasoning and then holding as a logical sequence that such conclusion wias the intention of the parties,without discussing the facts with regard to such intention,is illustrated by the case of Ins. Co.v.Tweed,7 Wall.44. The facts in that case were these; an explosion occurred in a warehouse situated directly across the street from one owned by the plaintiff.A fire ensued which was communicated to the plaintiffs warehouse which was burned.The policy of the plaintiff It does not seem to me to be a logical statement to say,that be cause in a physical sense the explosion was the approximate cause,therefore it was the proximate cause within the 
From this examination of the cases,it becomes
fully apparent that the application of the maxim in this branch of the law ought to be a natural and practical one.As was said by one of the judges,the maxim has been limited and moulded by the courts so that expression ray be given to the intention of the parties. As a rule persons making these contracts do not take into consideration refined and subtile reasoning, and therefore the ) esS metaphiysical and the more practical the reasoning,the greater the justice that ,fill be rendered to all persons concerned.
18.
B.In the law of common carriers.
We will now discuss the maxim as applied to the law of common carriers.
A common carrier may be defined as one who,by virtue of his calling,holus himself out to the public as a transporter of goods for hire,for all those who choose to em- 
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As has already been said the common carriers liability is founded upon public policy.With this fact in view it is a natural and logical proposition, that is from the standpoint of public welfare that the courts should view the facts,when callec upon to determine whether ot not any of the exceptions memtioned were the proximate cause of the loss. It is clear that unless the development of the law of comr~on carriers is founded upon the basis of public policy,it will become a confused, conflicting and uncertain.
-As a consequence the welfare of the public will be greatly inj ured.
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C. In actions for negligence and breach of contract.
In a general way the application of the maxim in these two classes of cases is the same.In either case the defendant is only liable for the natural and probable consequences of his acts. In law the defendants acts are considered the proximate cause of such natural and probable re-
Sul t S.
As the reasoning used in applying the maxim in a.r&tisb.$ fo breach of contract is so similar to that used in actions ±or negligence,it will only be necessary to discuss the latter.
When a suit for damages causeu by negligence comes before the courts,they examine the facts for the purpose of ascertaining whether there exists between the aamage complained of and the acts of the defendant a certain cansual relation,to wit;that the damage was the natural and probable consequence of the wrongful act. If there exists such a relation between the two,then the negligence is the proximate cause of such loss and the defendant is liable.
In the case of Gerdhart v.Bates, ' Ell.&.B1.490.
Lord Campbell states the matter in this viay,he said "If the wrong and the legal damage are not known to common experience to be a usual sequenceand the damage does not according to From this brief discussion of the method pursued by the courts in applying the maxim in suits for negligence and breach of contractit is clear that it is entirely different from the methods that the courts should use in cases that fall in either of the other two divisions previously discus sed.
27.
Conclusion.
The conclusion is necessarily a general one.The facts of a case bein-ascertained by testimony,the maxim is applied for the purpose of ascertaining the rights and liabilities of the respective parties to the proceeding.Those facts alone are viewed as cause and effect which have a direct bearing upon those rights and liabilities. The question is sometimes,whether a cause is proximate to an effect,sometimes it is which of several causes is immediate to an effect; sometimes the question is whether an effect shall be referred to a certain cause as its proximate resilt,sometimes it is to which of several causes the e''ffect shall be referred. There are three divisions into which cases involving one or more of these questions falls. The method of applying the maxim in each division is of a different nature from that employed in the others.
It is perhaps unfortunate that this division has been made, but as has been shown it is a necessary one. If all the courts would recognize these divisions and use the line of reasoning applicable to each in applying the maxim, the law in regard to this subject 1ould become much more settled and uniform than it is at present.
A..,
*
There is a strong tendency to cite authorities indiscriminately,seemingly not recognizing that cases in which thd rnaxim has been applied,are of no value as authorities except in that branch of the la,r which governed the reasoning in that p--urticular case. It is apparent that as long as this practice prevails,the law governing the application of the maxim .ill be vaileL in obacurity,and in many cases great injustice will be done. It is only by observing the various principles presented that the true legal application of the maxim can be
given.
